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Underpricing, Overhang, and the Cost of 
Going Public to Preexisting Shareholders 
STEVEN D. DOLVIN AND BRADFORD D.JORDAN 
Abstract: IPO underpricing has been extensively studied; however, its impact on the wealth of 
preexisting shareholders has not been closely examined. We address the question ofwhether or 
not periods of high underpricing adversely affect preexisting shareholders. We find that high 
levels of underpricing are associated with increased share retention, which effectively offsets 
much of the potential cost. Overall, we find that the percentage of shareholder wealth lost is 
surprisingly stable over time, unlike underpricing itself. We also find that many factors known 
to be related to underpricing are not significant determinants of the cost of going public to 
preexisting owners. 
Keywordsl IPO, underpricing, share overhang 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much research on IPO valuation focuses on underpricing, which is conventionally 
defined as the percentage difference between the initial offer price and the closing 
market price on the first day of trading. This measure, typically called the initial or 
first-day return, is the percentage gain earned by an investor fortunate enough (in 
most cases) to purchase the stock at the offer price and liquidate at the first-day close. 
However, while underpricing correctly measures the return to a particular type of 
investor, it does not accurately reflect, in general, the opportunity cost of going public 
to the issuing firm. 
In a typical IPO, the shares sold constitute only a fraction of the total shares in the 
issuing firm. Preexisting shareholderswho do not sell in the IPO suffer dilution in value 
as a result ofunderpricing, but the dilution they experience may be quite small relative 
to that suggested by the level ofthe initial return. To give an extreme example, suppose 
a firm with a large number of shares outstanding goes public by selling a single share. 
Obviously, any underpricing is economically irrelevant. In a more realistic setting, if the 
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number of shares sold is small relative to the total, even a large degree of underpricing
may translate into a very modest amount of dilution.
In broader terms, the wealth loss experienced by preexisting shareholders in an
IPO depends on the ‘money left on the table,’ which is the underpricing measured in
dollars. Underpricing measured as a first-day return is money left on the table divided
by the gross proceeds from the offer, which is only indirectly relevant. As shown by
Barry (1989), what really matters is the money left on the table relative to preexisting
shareholder wealth, which we refer to as the ‘opportunity cost of issuance’ (OCI).
Although existing studies such as Hill (2006), Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Habib
and Ljungqvist (2001) explore the relation between underpricing and share retention
on a limited basis, they do not directly address the effect of underpricing on the wealth
of preexisting firm owners.
Of particular interest in this regard is the recent Internet ‘bubble’ period. Previous
studies document a large increase in underpricing during 1999–2000, posing potential
explanations for the increase such as changes in insider ownership structure (Habib
and Ljungqvist, 2001) or changes in the desire of issuers to employ underwriters that
are able to provide research coverage and other services (Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
Although these studies provide some potential reasons for the increase in underpricing,
they and other existing studies generally do not explore the effect of this high level of
underpricing on the wealth of preexisting owners. Therefore, our contribution is to
fill this gap by addressing the question of whether or not high underpricing results in
a severe reduction in the wealth of preexisting shareholders.
In our empirical analyses, we focus on two major issues. First, we study the average
level of underpricing over time in conjunction with the extent of share retention by
preexisting owners. As in previous studies, we measure share retention using ‘overhang,’
which is the ratio of shares retained to shares offered (or a variation thereof). In
addition, we move beyond existing studies by estimating the underlying wealth loss from
underpricing as a percentage of the estimated value of shares owned by preexisting
shareholders of the firm (i.e., OCI). In our sample, for the periods 1986–1989,
1990–1998, 1999–2000 and 2001–2004 underpricing averages 7.58, 16.29, 65.64 and
10.99 percent, respectively. We find that share overhang is essentially constant in the
first two periods, averaging 2.61 and 2.50, respectively; however, in 1999–2000, share
overhang rises substantially to 4.40, subsequently falling in the 2001–2004 period to
2.57.
To explore whether the share retention decision effectively reduces the dilutive
impact of high underpricing, we also estimate OCI by period. We find that the
opportunity cost of issuance has varied within a relatively narrow range. For these
same four periods, the opportunity cost of issuance for firms going public averaged
4.79, 5.18, 6.22 and 4.00 percent, respectively. In fact, after controlling for various firm
and market characteristics we find no significant change at all. In other words, even
though IPO underpricing varied enormously, the opportunity cost of going public to
existing shareholders changed by very little, if any.
Second, we examine whether the variables known to be related to IPO underpricing
are also related to the opportunity cost of issuance for firms going public. Surprisingly,
we find that most of them are not, despite the fact that many are firm and offer specific.
Some even have opposite signs as compared to the results of previous studies. This
finding is troubling because it suggests that what is often the most important component
of the total cost of going public is poorly understood.
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Not distinguishing between underpricing and the opportunity cost of issuance is a
potentially serious issue in IPO research. The effects on underpricing of phenomena
such as informational asymmetry, third-party certification, changing firm composition,
increased desire for analyst coverage, and a host of other questions have been previously
investigated with somewhat mixed results. However, at least to a degree, some of this
research may be missing the point. It is not the rational economic objective of the
issuing firm to minimize underpricing (or to maintain it at some equilibrium or other
optimal level). As in all things corporate finance-related, the goal of the firm is to
maximize the wealth of the existing shareholders. All else the same, doing so in the
context of an IPO means focusing on minimizing the opportunity cost of issuance, not
necessarily underpricing.
Overall, we conclude that the variation in IPO underpricing through time has
generally been accompanied by similar, offsetting movements in overhang. This relation
results in an opportunity cost of issuance that is essentially stable through time,
particularly after controlling for characteristics of the offer. We further find that many
variables thought to ‘explain’ underpricing are more likely just associated with variation
in overhang, but not with the opportunity cost of issuance. We suggest that future
theoretical and empirical research on the cost of going public should focus much more
closely on the opportunity cost of issuance as opposed to only examining underpricing.
Such research should lead to a much richer understanding of the costs of going public.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops the relationship between
underpricing, overhang, and the opportunity cost of issuance; Section 3 describes the
data; Section 4 provides results; and Section 5 concludes.
2. UNDERPRICING, OVERHANG AND THE OPPORTUNITY COST OF ISSUANCE
(i) Money Left on the Table
The opportunity cost of issuance to a firm in an equity IPO, measured in dollars, is the
number of shares offered multiplied by the difference between the market price at the
end of the first trading day and the offer price. This quantity is the ‘money left on the
table,’ or MLOT. To understand the relationship between underpricing, overhang, and
the opportunity cost of issuance, it is useful to first consider an IPO with no secondary
shares offered (as is the case in well over half of all ordinary equity IPOs).
If no secondary shares are offered, then, by definition, MLOT can be written as
follows:
MLOT ≡ No (P1 − OP) ≡ NB(PB − P1) (1)
where No is the number of (primary) shares offered in the IPO; P 1 is the market price
at the end of the first trading day; OP is the offer price; NB is the number of shares prior
to the offer; and PB is the equity value per share immediately prior to the offering.1
Note that, also be definition, PB − P 1 is the dilution (per preexisting share) caused by
the offer. Thus, equation (1) is an identity stating that money left on the table is equal
to the dollar dilution suffered by preexisting shareholders.
1 The assumption that E (i.e., PB × NB) is the value immediately prior to the IPO is important in that it
assumes that any valuation effects from the IPO are already impounded in E.
C© 2008 The Authors
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If we rearrange equation (1), we have the following, which is equivalent to that
provided by Barry (1989):
(P1 − OP) ≡ NBNo (PB − P1). (2)
In equation (2), the left-hand side is the underpricing, in dollars, per share offered.
The first term on the right-hand side is the ratio of shares retained by non-selling
shareholders relative to shares sold in an IPO, and this measure is often referred to as
the share ‘overhang’ (e.g., Bradley and Jordan, 2002; and Loughran and Ritter, 2004).
The second term is the dilution per preexisting share, again measured in dollars (note
that in an IPO with no secondary shares offered, the number of preexisting shares
is the same as the number of shares retained). This very simple expression begins to
highlight the critical role played by overhang and makes it clear that the opportunity
cost of issuance (per preexisting share) will be much smaller than the underpricing
(per share offered) when the overhang is large.2
To generalize, when secondary shares are offered, MLOT can be written as:
MLOT ≡ No (P1 − OP) ≡ No,s (PB − OP) + (NB − No,s )(PB − P1) (3)
where No,s is the number of secondary shares offered, and all other variables are as
previously defined. Equation (3) defines MLOT as the sum of two components. The first
term is the total opportunity loss to selling shareholders (in dollars) from selling shares
at a price below their potential market value. The second is the total dollar dilution
suffered by nonselling (i.e., retaining) shareholders. Thus, equation (3) allocates the
opportunity cost of issuance between secondary shares sold and retained shares.
Following Barry (1989), we next solve equation (3) for the preissuance equity value,
which provides the following:
PB ≡ P1 + No,p(P1 − OP)NB (4)
where No,p is the number of primary shares offered, and all other variables are as
previously defined. Note that PB is equal to P 1 if there is zero underpricing; therefore,
we also refer to PB as the ‘zero dilution’ price.
Defining preexisting share value (i.e., PB) as the first day closing price plus the per
share dilution from MLOT (associated with primary shares sold) follows existing theory
and practice; however, this approach ignores the possibility that non-traded shares are
typically less valuable due to a lack of liquidity (i.e., a liquidity discount). Thus, in
robustness checks, we also examine an alternative definition of preexisting share value
that captures industry specific liquidity discounts as identified in Das et al. (2003). We
find that our results are robust to this, and other, alternative definitions.
(ii) Opportunity Cost of Issuance
A few existing studies recognize the potentially offsetting effect on issuance costs
associated with increasing the number of shares retained. For example, Brennan and
2 Equation (2) is also similar to a decomposition presented in Ritter (2002).
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Franks (1997) examine a sample of IPOs in the United Kingdom, detailing that firms
that sell only a fraction of existing shares, all else equal, face lower issuance costs.
Brennan and Franks attempt to quantify the effect of the share retention decision;
however, they do so only for a sample of 69 firms over the years 1986–1989, which is a
period characterized by relatively stable prices, making it difficult to gauge the response
of issuers to fluctuations in market valuations over time.
More recently, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Bradley and Jordan (2002) suggest
that owners who sell fewer shares suffer only marginally from underpricing, both
finding that there is a positive relation between share overhang and underpricing.
Habib and Ljungqvist imply that more shares retained reduces the incentive to control
underpricing, likely because there is reduced dilution associated with underpricing.
Unfortunately, neither Habib and Ljungqvist nor Bradley and Jordan quantify the
underlying opportunity cost of issuance. Therefore, we attempt to fill this gap by more
explicitly deriving a simple formula that can be used to directly calculate the OCI of
an issue and by applying this measure to a sample of IPOs over a broad period of time
(i.e., 1986–2004).
By definition, OCI is equal to money left on the table relative to preexisting equity
value (i.e., the percentage of wealth lost by preexisting owners), which implies:
OCI = MLOT
E
= No (P1 − OP)
PB NB
(5)
where all variables are as previously defined. Substituting for PB using equation (4)
produces the following explicit formula for estimating OCI:
OCI = No (P1 − OP)
P1 NA − No,pOP (6)
where NA is the total number of shares after the offering (i.e., NB + No,p), and all other
variables are as previously defined. The elimination of the unobservable PB allows OCI
to be directly and simply calculated.3
Further, we can decompose OCI into two components:
OCI =
[
No (P1 − OP)
No OP
]
×
[
No OP
P1 NA − No,pOP
]
. (7)
The first term is underpricing (i.e., money left on the table relative to the gross
proceeds of the offer), and the second term is the offering size as a percentage of
preexisting shareholder wealth. The reciprocal of this second term is a measure of
overhang, which we term economic overhang (EconOver).
To interpret EconOver , suppose an issue has no underpricing such that P 1 = PB =
OP. In this case, EconOver reduces to the ratio of shares outstanding before the offer,
NB , to shares offered, No , which is the measure of share overhang in equation (2).
3 Note that our derivation looks strictly at gross proceeds and does not account for the spread paid to the
underwriter or any other out of pocket expenses (e.g., legal and administrative fees). Adjusting for direct costs
provides the following: OCI = No (P1 −OPδ) + DCP1 NA−No,p OPδ + DC , where δ is equal to one minus the gross spread percentage,
and DC is equal to other direct costs paid. Other indirect costs are still not included.
C© 2008 The Authors
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EconOver can thus be interpreted as a weighted measure of share overhang in which
shares sold in the offer are weighted by the offer price, whereas preexisting shares are
weighted by the zero dilution price.
Simplifying equation (7) produces the following:
OCI = Initial × 1
EconOver
(8)
which clearly illustrates the relation among the variables of interest.4 Specifically,
higher levels of underpricing, all else equal, increase the wealth loss of preexisting
shareholders; however, increased share retention offsets this cost.
Rather than managing the number of shares offered, why do owners not attempt to
control underpricing, which would also result in a reduced OCI? At least two possible
explanations exist. First, underwriters have a great deal of influence in selecting the
offer price, which, in effect, determines the level of underpricing.5 Thus, issuers
may lack sufficient influence to adequately control underpricing. Second, Aggarwal
et al. (2002) develop a model that suggests managers strategically underprice IPOs to
maximize personal wealth from selling shares subsequent to the IPO (i.e., after the
lockup period expires). They attribute the potential gain to information momentum
associated with higher levels of underpricing, which is also addressed by Zheng et al.
(2005), Espenlaub and Tonks (1998) and Demers and Lewellen (2003), who show that
increased underpricing leads to increased trading volume and press coverage, which
may affect firm sales, as well as the price at which owners may subsequently sell retained
shares.
In addition to highlighting the true wealth loss of an IPO, the above decomposition
may also help explain a number of puzzling phenomena. For example, it has been
widely noted that, in contrast to earlier results in Carter and Manaster (1990), offerings
led by high prestige underwriters were more underpriced in the 1990s than offerings
led by less prestigious underwriters. However, the proposed certification effect from
the use of high prestige underwriters may really be an explanation of OCI, not
necessarily underpricing. In fact, as we document in a later section, IPOs led by high
prestige underwriters tend to have greater overhang, so the truth concerning the effect
of underwriter prestige on the cost of going public may be inadvertently masked.
Moreover, in subsequent analyses, we find a negative relationship between OCI and
investment bank prestige in the 1990s, which is consistent with a certification effect.
(iii) An Example: The eBay IPO
To illustrate the decomposition of an IPO’s initial return, consider eBay’s September
24, 1998, offering. The offer price was $18 per share, and the closing market price on
4 Brennan and Franks (1997) provide a formula similar to equation (8); however, they estimate the relation
simply by examining the number of shares retained versus the number of shares sold (i.e., share overhang)
without considering the value or type of these shares (i.e., economic overhang). Thus, their measure may
only approximate the actual opportunity cost of issuance. Further, rather than concentrating on preexisting
owners as a whole, they give more emphasis to the separate categories, i.e., selling shareholders versus
retaining shareholders.
5 The theories of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Rock (1986) suggest that underwriters purposefully
select the offer price in order to create sufficient underpricing to reward investors. Further, higher levels of
underpricing allow underwriters to better market an issue, thereby reducing the risk of undersubscription.
C© 2008 The Authors
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the first trading day was $47.38 per share. The underpricing was thus 163.22 percent.
With 3.5 million shares offered (and ignoring the overallotment option), the total
money left on the table by eBay and its investment bankers was ($47.38 − $18) × 3.5
million = $103 million.
Traditional thought suggests that such a high level of underpricing represents an
enormous opportunity cost to the preexisting shareholders of the issuing firm. But
does it? In eBay’s case, there were 36.5 million shares of stock outstanding prior to the
IPO (only a negligible 10,725 of which were sold in the IPO). Thus, for every share sold
in the IPO, there were more than 10 shares retained. As a result, the true opportunity
cost of the underpricing to eBay’s preexisting shareholders was vastly lower than that
suggested by the 163.22 percent initial return.
First, ignoring the 10,725 secondary shares, the share overhang in the eBay offering
was 36.5 million/3.5 million = 10.43. The underpricing in dollars was $47.38 − $18 =
$29.38. From equation (2), the dilution (i.e., PB − P 1) was thus $29.38/10.43 =
$2.82 per preexisting share, implying a pre-IPO value of $47.38 + $2.82 = $50.20.
As a percentage, then, the dilution was $2.82/$50.20 = 5.6 percent, which can also be
calculated by plugging directly into equation (6) and solving for OCI.
Thus, we see that the opportunity cost to eBay’s preexisting shareholders was only
5.6 percent. Keeping in mind that, in a single day, the IPO created a liquid market
where none existed for eBay’s preexisting 36.5 million shares with an aggregate value
of $1.7 billion (based on the closing stock price), preexisting shareholders might quite
rationally have viewed the 5.6 percent opportunity cost as a small price to pay.6 Also,
as we illustrate a little later, an OCI of 5.6 percent is very ordinary for US equity IPOs,
particularly in the latter part of the 1990s. Thus, as the case of eBay illustrates, a high
percentage initial return does not necessarily imply a large percentage opportunity cost
of issuance.
3. DATA
Our main data source is Thomson Financial’s SDC New Issues database. SDC captures
prospectus information on firm commitment initial public offerings (IPOs); however,
SDC only begins reporting data on several important items in 1986. Therefore, the
primary period we study begins January 1, 1986, and ends December 31, 2004.
In addition to company and issue information provided by SDC, we rely on the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to provide closing market
prices and shares outstanding information on the date of issuance. We make numerous
corrections to SDC data using information from Jay Ritter on a variety of items such
as incorrect file ranges and offer type classifications. Alexander Ljungqvist provided us
with information on shares sold as described in Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) for the
period 1996–2000.7 We also use Loughran and Ritter’s (2004) updated underwriter
6 Adjusting for a liquidity discount (see Section 4(iv)), eBay owners had an opportunity cost of issuance of
8.31%, which is higher than our reported OCI, but still much lower than the actual level of underpricing.
This results since even a large liquidity discount has little impact when the number of shares sold is small
relative to the total.
7 For correction information, see Ritter’s website http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/SDCCOR.PDF] and
Ljungqvist’s website [ http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/∼aljungqv/research.htm]. We thank Jay Ritter and
Alexander Ljungqvist for providing us with these data.
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reputation variables (i.e., updates to those originally provided by Carter and Manaster
(1990)), firm founding dates, and Internet classification.
As is commonly done, we eliminate various types of issues, including closed-end
funds, unit issues, American depositary shares, mutual-to-stock conversions, reverse
leveraged buyouts, real estate investment trusts, and spin-offs. Unlike many studies, we
also eliminate firms with multiple share classes (Smart and Zutter, 2003). The reason
is that determination of overhang can be problematic in such cases, particularly in
circumstances where, e.g., 1 Class A share can be converted into 10 Class B shares. After
elimination of these issues, we are left with a final sample of 4,913 IPOs, consisting of 866
from the 1986–1989 period; 2,884 from the 1990–1998 period; 764 from the 1999–2000
period; and 399 from the 2001 to 2004 period. We group issues into these particular
time periods in much of our analysis for comparability with previous studies.
4. RESULTS
(i) Evolution of Initial, OCI, and EconOver Through Time
Given the discussion in our previous sections, we focus primarily on the relation between
initial returns (Initial), the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI), and economic overhang
(EconOver). Thus, Table 1 reports means (with medians in parentheses) by year for these
three variables in columns (3)–(5), respectively. Share overhang (ShareOver), which is
defined as shares retained relative to total shares offered, is reported in column (6).
Note that equation (8) will not hold, in general, for the averages in this table (i.e., the
product of the averages is not equal to the average of the products).
Reviewing the year-by-year results in Table 1, EconOver , on average, ranges from a
low of 2.82 (in 1994) to a high of 9.01 (in 1999). The medians range from 2.38 (in
1986) to 5.81 (in 1999). Thus, EconOver is typically greater than one, and, at times,
much greater. As a result, Initial , on average, ranges from roughly 1.5 times the average
OCI (in 1987) to 10 times as large (in 1999). ShareOver ranges from 2.31 (in 2004) to
4.68 (in 2000).
As observed by Loughran and Ritter (2004), among others, underpricing changed
over the period examined in Table 1. As shown in Table 2, in our sample, Initial averages
7.58 percent during 1986–1989, 16.29 percent during 1990–1998, 65.64 percent during
1999–2000, and 10.99 during 2001–2004. Average OCI displays a similar pattern, but
the variation is much less dramatic. For the same four periods, OCI averages 4.79, 5.18,
6.22, and 4.00 percent, respectively.
Like OCI, EconOver does not increase significantly over the first two subperiods
(the averages are 3.04 and 3.26 for 1986–1989 and 1990–1998, respectively, which are
insignificantly different). ShareOver actually decreases slightly. However, like Initial ,
EconOver jumps substantially in 1999 and 2000, averaging 8.84, which is economically
and statistically much larger than in the previous periods. Similarly, ShareOver rises from
an average of 2.50 in 1990–1998 to 4.40 in 1999–2000. Finally, Initial , OCI, EconOver
and ShareOver all decline significantly in the 2001–2004 period, returning to values
similar to those observed in the pre-bubble period.
To address this evolution more formally, in unreported results we compare the
combined 1986–1998 period (i.e., pre-bubble) to the 2001–2004 period (i.e., post-
bubble). As Table 2 suggests, we find that OCI is slightly lower in the post-bubble period;
however, the difference between the periods is only marginally significant (t-statistic of
C© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation C© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008
442 DOLVIN AND JORDAN
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by Year
N Initial OCI EconOver ShareOver Initial vs. OCI
1986 397 7.90 5.46 2.88 2.44 2.44
(2.60) (1.33) (2.38) (2.00)
1987 270 6.97 4.65 2.96 2.58 2.10
(1.96) (0.96) (2.46) (2.14)
1988 104 6.73 4.08 3.35 2.94 1.59
(2.95) (1.29) (2.92) (2.50)
1989 95 8.95 3.13 3.61 3.04 6.06
(4.76) (1.67) (2.85) (2.30)
1990 92 12.22 3.60 2.90 2.33 5.89
(7.97) (3.34) (2.66) (2.16)
1991 181 14.52 5.26 3.14 2.47 6.16
(10.29) (3.54) (2.77) (2.18)
1992 260 13.25 4.85 2.98 2.38 7.57
(5.52) (2.52) (2.54) (2.12)
1993 349 15.00 4.86 3.12 2.42 10.56
(7.14) (2.89) (2.64) (2.15)
1994 334 10.61 4.27 2.82 2.33 7.42
(5.00) (2.36) (2.43) (2.06)
1995 407 22.34 6.22 3.47 2.46 13.64
(14.29) (4.91) (2.91) (2.20)
1996 587 18.16 5.55 3.44 2.60 12.24
(10.00) (3.56) (2.65) (2.15)
1997 417 14.07 4.89 3.12 2.48 11.32
(8.57) (2.88) (2.67) (2.20)
1998 257 20.96 5.65 4.02 2.93 4.95
(8.33) (2.82) (2.78) (2.42)
1999 419 72.78 6.96 9.01 4.17 14.40
(38.40) (6.26) (5.81) (3.70)
2000 345 56.98 5.31 8.65 4.68 12.36
(27.63) (4.98) (5.55) (4.07)
2001 59 14.82 3.63 4.08 3.31 6.03
(13.00) (2.92) (3.66) (3.20)
2002 40 11.88 3.14 3.59 2.87 4.14
(8.45) (3.17) (3.17) (2.47)
2003 61 12.71 4.61 3.30 2.67 5.17
(9.76) (3.28) (2.96) (2.58)
2004 239 9.45 4.08 2.84 2.31 4.25
(2.00) (1.21) (2.48) (2.25)
Notes:
The table provides means (with medians in parentheses) for underpricing (Initial , percentage change from
offer price to market price at end of first trading day), the opportunity cost of issuance (OCI, money left
on the table divided by preissuance equity value), economic overhang (EconOver , preissuance equity value
divided by funds raised), and share overhang (ShareOver , shares retained relative to total shares offered).
Additionally, the table also provides t-statistics from difference of means tests for Initial versus OCI in each
year. Data are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases.
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1.72). Further, share overhang is not statistically different in the pre- and post-bubble
periods (t-statistic of −0.39). The spike in underpricing in the bubble period appears
to be an anomaly that is most likely driven by extremely high market valuations
during these years. However, the decision by owners to retain more shares during
this period resulted in OCI changing by very little. This stability in OCI suggests that
the large level of underpricing had only minimal impact on the wealth of existing firm
owners.
Table 2 also provides some insight into why both economic and share overhang
changed so dramatically. Comparing the 1986–1989 and 1990–1998 periods, the
average number of shares outstanding before the IPO, N B , and the average number
retained, N B,r , approximately doubled. Both the aftermarket price (P 1) and offer
price (OP) also increased, so the net effect is that average firm size (in terms of market
cap) more than doubled. However, offering sizes (Proceeds) kept pace, and, as a result,
economic overhang was little changed.
Moving from 1990–1998 to 1999–2000, shares outstanding before the offer more
than tripled and valuations per share doubled. As a result, average firm size (again
referring to market cap) increased by a factor of six or more. The average number
of shares offered only doubled, however, so overhang grew. Thus, several forces were
at work. Over the 1986–2000 period, firms grew much larger in terms of preexisting
shares, and, at the same time, valuations per share increased. Offerings also grew in
terms of both shares offered and offer prices. The key difference is that the growth in
offer size was similar to the growth in firm size in 1990–1998, but lagged it substantially
in 1999–2000, thereby creating the jump in share and economic overhang. Thus, the
increase in overhang appears to be attributable to issuers responding to increases in
valuations during this period. This relation becomes even more apparent in light of
the reversal in valuations and overhang that occurred in the 2001–2004 period.
It is possible that the decision of issuers to retain more shares is a rational response to
high expected levels of underpricing. However, an additional, non-exclusive possibility
is the wealth effect hypothesis proposed by Ritter (1984). Specifically, Ritter suggests
that higher valuations allow issuers to offer fewer shares (relative to the total), while still
collecting the same amount of proceeds, which is obviously the case during the bubble
period. Both of these factors lead to a higher level of overhang. Thus, the offsetting
effect of overhang could be a rational response to expected underpricing, a byproduct
of market valuations, or some combination of these two effects.
Table 2 shows that OCI is noticeably higher in the bubble period, even though many
issuers retained 100 percent of secondary shares, so the increased share retention did
not completely offset the extremely high underpricing during that period. Loughran
and Ritter (2004) document that firms going public over the first three periods we
examine changed in ways that suggest they became riskier to investors, which may
mean that they must leave more money on the table. Loughran and Ritter find
that this ‘changing risk composition’ hypothesis cannot explain the fluctuations in
underpricing through time. However, this hypothesis really relates more directly to
OCI than underpricing, and it is possible, as we explore subsequently, that the modest
changes in OCI can be explained by this phenomenon.
In unreported results, we also examine correlations between the variables of interest.
Over the full 1986–2004 period, the correlation between Initial and OCI is relatively
low, 0.25, whereas the correlation between Initial and EconOver is 0.79. Thus, empirical
studies that focus on variation in underpricing across IPOs may actually be learning
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more about the variation in overhang than the opportunity cost of going public.
Surprisingly, the correlation between OCI and EconOver is only 0.02.
These correlations raise an interesting question. Many factors are known to be
associated with IPO initial returns. What is not known is if these same factors also
affect OCI. We begin to explore this and related issues in the following section.
(ii) Determinants of OCI and EconOver: Univariate Analyses
To begin to explore potential causes of the variation in Initial , EconOver and OCI,
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on some selected firm and offer characteristics.
The variables in the table are representative of the types commonly examined in
IPO research dealing with underpricing, but the list is not intended to be exhaustive.
Specifically, we report mean values by period and t-tests for differences in means across
periods, for the following:
VC = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is venture capital- (VC-) backed;
Age = Firm age, measured in years;
Integer = Dummy variable equal to one if the IPO offer price is an integer;
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics by Period
1986–1989 1990–1998 1999–2000 2001–2004 t-statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) v (2) (2) v (3) (3) v (4)
VC 0.25 0.42 0.64 0.39 −9.50 −11.14 8.12
Age 18.41 11.02 8.65 16.42 7.85 4.27 −5.96
Integer 0.60 0.76 0.94 0.83 −9.04 −14.74 5.27
HT 0.21 0.33 0.27 0.20 −7.67 3.78 2.54
Internet na 0.02 0.48 0.05 na −24.86 20.11
Rank 6.96 6.60 8.01 7.70 4.15 −19.06 2.88
Primary 0.60 0.60 0.85 0.69 −0.17 −15.68 5.89
PartialU 2.25 6.94 21.14 4.30 −16.03 −11.75 13.34
PartialD −5.86 −7.21 −5.93 −8.20 3.71 −2.72 2.96
Upward 26.56 38.31 60.73 32.83 −6.70 −11.29 9.48
Downward 44.80 38.18 28.14 44.11 3.46 5.39 −5.37
NoAdjust 28.64 23.51 11.13 23.06 2.97 8.97 −4.97
Notes:
The table presents summary statistics (i.e., means and difference tests) for four periods: (1) 1986 to 1989,
(2) 1990 to 1998, (3) 1999 to 2000 and (4) 2001 to 2004. VC is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO
is backed by a venture capitalist, zero otherwise. Age is the age of the issuing firm in years at the time of
the offering. Integer is a dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is an integer, zero otherwise. HT is
a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a high technology (but non-Internet) firm, zero otherwise.
Internet is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is an Internet firm, zero otherwise. Rank is the rank of
the lead underwriter as given by Carter and Manaster (1990) and updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004).
Primary is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue is a pure primary offering, zero otherwise. PartialU is
the percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer price if the adjustment is positive, zero
otherwise; and PartialD is the percentage change from the original midfile price to the offer price if the
adjustment is negative, zero otherwise. The final three rows report the percentage of issues whose offer
prices, relative to the original midfile prices, are adjusted upward (Upward), downward (Downward), or not
at all (NoAdjust). Data are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases.
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HT = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is in a ‘high-tech,’ but
non-Internet-related, industry;
Internet = Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is Internet-related;
Rank = Carter-Manaster (1990) rank of the lead underwriter, as updated by
Loughran and Ritter (2004);
Primary = Dummy variable equal to one if the offering has 100 percent primary
shares;
PartialU = The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer
price if the change is positive (and zero otherwise);
PartialD = The percentage change (from the original midfile) in the final offer
price if the change is negative (and zero otherwise);
Upward = The percentage of firms that have a positively adjusted offer price;
Downward = The percentage of firms that have a negatively adjusted offer price; and;
NoAdjust = The percentage of firms that have no adjustment from the original
midfile price to the offer price.
Comparing the four periods in Table 3, the percentage of firms with VC backing
more than doubled, going from 25 percent in 1986–1989 to 64 percent in 1999–2000,
subsequently falling to 39 percent in the post-bubble period. Average firm age fell
significantly from 18.41 to 11.02 years in the first two periods, then to 8.65 years in the
bubble period. However, in the 2001–2004 period average firm age rises dramatically
to 16.42 years. Bradley et al. (2004) show that IPOs with integer offer prices tend to
be more underpriced. They argue that integer prices are, in part, a sign of valuation
uncertainty. The percentage of integer offers rises over the first three periods from
60 percent to 94 percent, subsequently falling to 83 percent in the last period.
The percentage of firms in high-tech, but non-Internet-related, industries grows
modestly, rising from 21 to 33 over the first two periods then falling to 27 and 23,
respectively, over the last two periods. However, in the bubble period, the percentage
of offerings that were Internet-related reached 48 percent, so 75 percent of offerings in
the 1999–2000 period were either technology- or Internet-related. The average ranking
of the lead bank falls from 6.96 to 6.60 as we move from the first period to the second,
but rises to 8.01 in the bubble period, subsequently falling to 7.70 in the 2001–2004
period. Interestingly, the percentage of offers that consist entirely of primary shares is
relatively constant in all but the bubble period, where 85 percent of the offerings are
purely primary shares.
The next two items we examine are PartialU and PartialD. Conditional on an
increase in the offer price relative to the initial midfile price, the average increase
grew substantially, both economically and statistically, over the first three periods we
study, reaching over 21 percent in 1999–2000, but subsequently falling to 4.3 percent in
2001–2004. The average conditional decrease follows a cyclical pattern over the entire
period (falls, rises, then falls), but the changes are economically small.
Table 3 also reports the percentage of issues with positive and negative offer
price adjustments. In the first period, about 70 percent of all issues had offer price
adjustments. Over 44 percent of all issues had negative price adjustments, compared
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to 27 percent with positive adjustments. In the second period, upward and downward
adjustments both occur for about 38 percent of firms going public. In the bubble
period, however, 61 percent of all issues had a positive adjustment, compared to 28 with
a negative adjustment. These adjustments, particularly upward, may be an indication
of expected underpricing and serve as a signal to owners to retain more shares.
Taken together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that much changed in the IPO market over
the period we study. The firms going public in the bubble period (which are also those
with the highest average level of underpricing and overhang) were (1) more likely
to be VC-backed; (2) much younger; (3) more likely to be integer-priced; (4) more
concentrated in technology- and Internet-related fields; and (5) more likely to have
positive offer price adjustments (and larger price adjustments as well).
The factors identified just above are known to be associated with underpricing;
however, it is unclear whether these factors also affect the opportunity cost of issuance.
To illustrate this point, we separate all IPOs in our sample into two groups. The first
group consists of firms that are: (1) VC-backed; (2) young (age < 8 years); (3) integer-
priced; (4) classified as either high-tech or Internet; and (5) have a high-prestige (rank
8 or 9) lead investment bank.8 We refer to these firms as the ‘screened’ group. Note
that (1) the firms in this group have all of these characteristics and (2) neither offer
price adjustments nor overhang are considered in forming the groups. The second
group contains all the remaining IPOs, and we refer to it as the ‘unscreened’ group.
For the two groups, we tabulate Initial , OCI, EconOver , ShareOver , PartialU , and Upward
by period and by group, and we report the results in Table 4.
Comparing the two groups, several things are apparent. First, firms that meet the
screening criteria have much higher share overhang in every period and are much
more likely to have a positive offer price adjustment. The screened group’s initial
returns are almost 50 percent larger in the first period, and they are over 100 percent
larger in the later three periods. In each period, the screened group has a significantly
larger PartialU , and a greater percentage of firms in the screened group have upward
adjustments. Finally, the percentage of offerings meeting the screening criteria grows
from 5 percent (39 of 866) in the first period to 37 percent (282 of 764) in the bubble
period. In the last period, only 6.5 percent of the issues (26 of 399) meet the criteria.
In evaluating these results, keep in mind that the members of the screened group have
all five of the characteristics we use. As we approach the bubble period, the unscreened
group contains a growing percentage of firms that meet some, but not all, of these
criteria.
Interestingly, OCI is not different (economically or statistically) between the two
groups in any of the three later periods. In the first period, the screened group actually
has a lower OCI. Thus, the particular set of screens we employ seems to be useful
in identifying factors that lead to differential overhang and underpricing, but not
differential OCI, which is consistent with our earlier discussion on correlations. The
lack of significance also suggests that OCI is not understood particularly well. In the
next section, we attempt to sort out the issues raised by our univariate analyses in a
multiple regression framework.
8 Based on univariate analyses of our sample (not reported, but available on request from the authors),
these criteria are generally associated with higher degrees of average underpricing (and overhang) over the
entire period we study. Similar results have been widely reported in the IPO literature. However, this list is
not intended to be exhaustive, and we do not claim that any of these characteristics have a causal relationship
with underpricing.
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Table 4
Statistics by Category and Time Period
Variable Unscreened Screened t-statistic
Panel A: 1986–1989
n 827 39
Initial 7.32 13.19 −2.31
OCI 4.88 2.74 3.13
EconOver 2.96 4.79 −5.28
ShareOver 2.55 3.93 −4.65
PartialU 2.03 6.91 −3.42
Upward 25.15 56.41 −3.82
Panel B: 1990–1998
n 2,631 253
Initial 14.76 32.16 −7.55
OCI 5.17 5.29 −0.34
EconOver 3.05 5.46 −9.27
ShareOver 2.39 3.62 −9.83
PartialU 5.71 19.66 −10.04
Upward 35.88 63.64 −8.75
Panel C: 1999–2000
n 482 282
Initial 43.19 104.03 −8.38
OCI 5.95 6.67 −1.20
EconOver 6.19 13.38 −9.37
ShareOver 3.74 5.55 −10.02
PartialU 14.92 31.77 −6.46
Upward 52.90 74.11 −6.12
Panel D: 2001–2004
n 373 26
Initial 9.68 29.78 −4.33
OCI 3.95 4.78 −0.80
EconOver 2.94 6.53 −4.07
ShareOver 2.42 4.62 −3.64
PartialU 3.45 16.44 −3.74
Upward 30.29 69.23 −4.08
Notes:
The table reports means and difference tests for underpricing (Initial) in percent, the opportunity cost
of issuance (OCI) in percent, economic overhang (EconOver), share overhang (ShareOver), partial upward
adjustment (PartialU ) in percent, and the percentage of issues adjusted upward (Upward) by time period
and segment, where the segment is determined by venture capital backing, the age of issuer, offer price
characteristics, high technology or Internet status and underwriter quality level. Screened represents issues
that are venture capital backed, young (age < 8), priced on an integer, classified as a high technology or
Internet firm, and have a highly ranked (Carter-Manaster rank of 8 or 9) underwriter. Unscreened represents
all other issues. Panel A reports results for the 1986 to 1989 period; Panel B reports results for the 1990 to
1998 period; Panel C reports results for the 1999 to 2000 period; and Panel D reports results for the 2001 to
2004 period. Data are from the SDC New Issues and CRSP databases.
(iii) Determinants of OCI and EconOver: Multivariate Analyses
Motivated by our previous section, we attempt to more specifically determine if the
factors known to be related to underpricing are also related to OCI. We base this
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multivariate analysis on the following regression:
Depi = α + β1LnProceeds + β2VC + β3LnAge + β4Integer + β5HT + β6Internet
+ β7Rank + β8Primary + β9NasLag + β10PartialU + β11PartialD
+ β12Nineties + β13Bubble + β14PostBubble + εI (9)
where Dep is the dependent variable and is either Initial , OCI, EconOver , or ShareOver .
Most of the independent variables have been previously defined. The exceptions are
LnProceeds, which is the natural logarithm of the inflation-adjusted (to 1986 values)
proceeds; LnAge, which is the natural logarithm of 1 plus Age; and NasLag , which is the
cumulative return on the Nasdaq composite index for the fifteen trading days prior to
the issue date. We also create three time-related dummy variables. Nineties takes on a
value of one for the years 1990–1998, zero otherwise; Bubble takes on a value of one
during 1999–2000, zero otherwise; and PostBubble takes on a value of one during 2001–
2004, zero otherwise. If we are successful in explaining the variation over time in Initial ,
OCI, EconOver and ShareOver , these dummies should be insignificantly different from
zero. We estimate the regression without the dummies for the four subperiods and then
include the dummies for the full-period results.
The results of this analysis are reported in Panels A through D in Table 5. In Panel A,
Initial is the dependent variable. Looking at the four subperiods, there is a noticeable
lack of consistency for many of the dependent variables. Only the partial adjustment
variables and the Internet dummy variable are highly significant in all cases. NasLag is
relatively consistent, but only marginally significant in the last period. Integer and LnAge
also maintain the same sign throughout and are significant in the first two periods, but
lack significance in the later periods.
Looking at the full sample results in the rightmost column of Panel A, the coefficients
and significance levels are, for the most part, what would be expected from the
subperiod results and previous studies. The Nineties dummy is economically small and
statistically insignificant; thus, the model explains the increase in underpricing from
the first to the second period. However, the Bubble dummy is large (24.91) and highly
significant (t = 10.84), so the model fails to account for much of the underpricing in this
period. Recalling that underpricing during the third period averaged 65.64 percent,
a simple interpretation is that about 38 percent (24.91/65.64) of the underpricing
remains unexplained or, alternatively, approximately 50 percent of the increase in
underpricing from the 1990–1998 period to the 1999–2000 period is not captured by
the model. In Panel
B, we replace Initial with OCI as the dependent variable and rerun the regressions.
No independent variables are statistically significant in all four subperiods, and the
explanatory power is low. This is troubling because, from a mechanical perspective, the
only difference between Panels A and B is that the dependent variable has a different
denominator (Initial can be calculated as MLOT divided by total offer proceeds; OCI
is MLOT divided by pre-offer total equity). The implication is that the determinants
of OCI, which is usually the single biggest cost of going public to the issuing firm, are
poorly understood.
One very interesting result in Panel B is that Rank generally has a negative sign, and
it is significant in all but the bubble period, which is contrary to the results in Panel A.
Thus, firms that use more prestigious underwriters do, in fact, appear to have a lower
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cost of going public, just as suggested by Carter and Manaster (1990). PartialU and
PartialD are highly significant in the second and third subperiods, and the coefficients
do not display the pronounced asymmetry shown in Panel A.
In contrast to Initial in Panel A, the full period results for OCI show that the time
period dummies are not significant. In other words, the model accounts for the
variation in OCI over time, including the bubble period. We view this result as lending
support to the changing risk composition hypothesis suggested by Loughran and Ritter
(2004). Also, based on our decomposition of the OCI in an IPO, the culprit in the
model’s failure in Panel A must be overhang. We explore this possibility in Panels C
and D.
Beginning with economic overhang in Panel C, once again there is a general lack
of consistency across the four subperiods. However, a notable exception is Rank, which
is positive and highly significant in each period. Thus, higher prestige banks are
consistently associated with higher economic overhang. From Panel A, the association
of underwriter quality to underpricing changes over time, which previous researchers
have concluded is inconsistent with a certification effect. However, the combined effect
of underwriter prestige on underpricing and overhang results in a consistently negative
relation to OCI (Panel B), which is consistent with a certification effect. PartialU is also
significant in all four subperiods.
The full period results for EconOver show that there is little difference between the
first two subperiods. The Nineties dummy is small and insignificant at conventional
levels. In contrast, the Bubble dummy is large and highly significant. Thus, the
unexplained increase in underpricing in Panel A is associated with a jump in EconOver.
Since the regressions control for various firm characteristics, the unexplained increase,
which is similar to what is observed for underpricing, is most likely a result of issuers
responding to market conditions. Compared to OCI in Panel B, the explanatory power
is relatively high. As a result, we suspect that underpricing regressions such as those in
Panel A probably tell us more about variation in overhang than they do about the cost
of going public to the issuing firm. This view is strengthened by the full period results,
which show a general consistency when comparing underpricing and overhang.
Because EconOver implicitly embeds both the IPO aftermarket price and offer price,
we also examine ShareOver in Panel D, which embeds neither, allowing us to more
explicitly examine the retention choice of preexisting owners. Comparing Panels C
and D, the results are similar and in some cases, sharper. Rank is again positive and
highly significant in all four subperiods, leaving little doubt that higher prestige banks
are associated with higher overhang offerings. Another relatively strong and consistent
result in Panel D is that greater positive adjustments in offer prices (PartialU ) are
associated with higher share overhang, which is consistent with an earlier univariate
result. Not surprisingly, larger offerings are generally associated with lower share
overhang (though not strongly so in the last two periods). Finally, Internet firms have
much higher share overhang.
Examining the full period results in Panel D, the Nineties dummy is not significant;
however, the Bubble dummy is. From Table 2, the increase in average share overhang
from the second to the third period is 1.90. The Bubble coefficient is 1.10, so we explain
a little less than half of the increase, which approximately matches the proportion of
the increase in underpricing we are able to explain in Panel A.
Overall, the results of this section clearly show that variables that are significantly
related to underpricing are not strongly related to OCI. Thus, the determinants of
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the cost of underpricing to the preexisting owners of firms going public are poorly
understood. Future research will be needed to examine this important question.
(iv) Robustness Test: Liquidity Discount and Preexisting Firm Value
As mentioned previously, equation (4) assumes that preexisting firm share value is
equivalent to the aftermarket price plus dilution associated with primary shares sold,
which implicitly ignores any liquidity discount that may be attached to the firm’s shares
prior to the offering.9 Since the ‘ink is drying’ on the deal when the final offering
values are chosen, this issue may have little influence on our results; nonetheless, it
does present a potential concern since the liquidity discount would impact the OCI
calculation. Specifically, if a liquidity discount exists, we would overstate preexisting
firm value and therefore understate OCI. If this difference is substantial, the attributes
we ascribe to OCI (such as its stability) may be inaccurate. Thus, for robustness, we
explore liquidity discounts and their potential impact on preexisting share value (and
OCI).
A common industry practice (see Rogers, 2005) is to apply a standard 20–30 percent
liquidity discount to firms whose shares are not traded. This approach is simply a
proportional adjustment and has little impact on our overall results. Although common
practice, this approach fails to consider the potentially unique industry component of
discounts. Thus, for our primary robustness tests, we concentrate on more explicit
discount values. Specifically, we follow Das et al. (2003), who develop liquidity discount
estimates by industry for the years 1986 to 2000.
We match the estimated discounts reported by Das et al. (2003) to our sample via
SIC codes, primarily concentrating on the 1990 to 2000 period, although we find in
unreported results that our findings are consistent across the entire sample period.
Once we have identified the appropriate liquidity discount, we adjust the calculated
preexisting share value, i.e., equation (4), as follows:
PB ≡
(
P1 + No,p(P1 − OP)NB
)
× (1 − di ) (10)
where di is the estimated industry-specific discount for illiquidity. For example, Das
et al. (2003) report a relatively high discount of 68.8 percent for semiconductor
companies. In contrast, biotechnology firms exhibit a relatively low average discount
of 17.4 percent.10 Applying the discount reduces PB and, therefore, increases OCI.
For the 1990 to 1998 and 1999 to 2000 time periods, OCI adjusted for the liquidity
discount is 8.59 and 9.39 percent, respectively, the difference of which is significant at
the 12 percent level. As reported in Table 2, these values compare to our standard OCI
estimates for the same periods of 5.18 and 6.22 percent, respectively, the difference of
which is significant at the one percent level. Thus, the liquidity adjustment, as expected,
increases our average estimate of OCI; however, a few other key results are worth noting.
9 Equation (4) also implicitly assumes that preexisting shareholders possess perfect information about after-
market behavior. If that were true, then, in absence of any strategic issues such as in Aggarwal et al. (2002),
the incentive to underprice would be negligible, which is inconsistent with the high levels observed.
10 Applying the estimated discounts to IPO firms is a conservative approach since the discount percentage
would likely be less for a firm that is ready to go public versus one in an earlier stage of financing, thereby
adding greater confidence to our results.
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First, the average OCI remains relatively small in comparison to the average level
of underpricing, especially in the bubble period. Thus, even after accounting for a
liquidity discount, it appears that underpricing severely overstates the opportunity cost
of issuance for preexisting owners. Second, the average levels of OCI across time,
particularly in the bubble, are not as significantly different as our earlier findings,
which further strengthens our conclusion that OCI is relatively stable over time. Lastly,
we calculate the correlation between our adjusted OCI values and share overhang,
finding a negative and significant relation. Thus, at least on a univariate basis, our
results appear robust to various measures of preexisting equity value.
To further our examination, we repeat the regression reported in the final column
of Panel B in Table 5. We evaluate our existing measure of OCI, as well as our
liquidity adjusted measure. As noted above, based on the availability of liquidity
discount estimates, we concentrate on the 1990 to 2000 period, which is also the most
relevant to our analysis. We find that the majority of the independent variables are
relatively consistent in their significance levels. For example, the market return prior
to the offering and the partial adjustment variables remain the most significant. Of
greatest importance to the robustness test, we find that the bubble dummy variable
remains small and insignificant, suggesting that even after controlling for potential
valuation discounts, the opportunity cost of issuance to preexisting shareholders
remains relatively stable over time.
5. SUMMARY
We examine the evolution of IPO underpricing from 1986 to 2004. Many previous
studies attempt to explain the variation in underpricing across firms and through
time, but researchers have essentially ignored the broader, and in many ways more
important, question of the impact of underpricing on the wealth of preexisting firm
shareholders.
To address this question, we build on Barry (1989) and derive a measure of the
opportunity cost of issuance (OCI) to firms going public. Our measure, which is simply
money left on the table divided by the pre-IPO value of the firm’s equity, captures both
the effect of underpricing on secondary shares sold and the cost of dilution associated
with primary shares issued. We also show explicitly how underpricing and OCI are
related. In particular, we find that OCI is the ratio of underpricing to a particular
measure of ‘overhang’ (i.e., shares retained relative to shares offered in the IPO).
In our empirical analysis, we address two issues. First, we examine whether high levels
of underpricing translate into large wealth losses to preexisting owners. Second, many
factors are known to be related to underpricing, but what is not known is if these same
factors are related to the OCI. Therefore, we examine these relations.
For the 1986–1989, 1990–1998, 1999–2000 and 2001–2004 periods, IPO underpric-
ing averages 7.58, 16.29, 65.64 and 10.99 percent, respectively. Across the same periods,
economic overhang follows a similar pattern, averaging 3.04, 3.26, 8.84 and 3.17,
respectively. The corresponding values for OCI are 4.79, 5.18, 6.22 and 4.00 percent.
Thus, OCI and underpricing have a similar pattern over the period we study, but the
variation in OCI is much less dramatic. In fact, after controlling for firm and offer
characteristics, we find no significant change in OCI, suggesting that owners issue
fewer shares during periods of higher underpricing, thereby offsetting the potential
cost. We also find that these results are robust to controls for liquidity discounts that
may be attached to the value of the firm prior to going public.
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Our analyses also show that many variables typically explored in studies of IPO
underpricing are not useful in explaining variation in OCI; instead, they are much
more strongly related to overhang. The implication is that the determinants of the
opportunity cost of going public are poorly understood. We also show how failing to
properly distinguish between OCI and underpricing can cause misleading inferences.
For example, in the 1990–1998 period, offerings led by high-prestige underwriters are
significantly more underpriced, which is contrary to the predictions and findings of
Carter and Manaster (1990). However, during this same period, firms with high-prestige
banks have a significantly lower OCI, but this fact is obscured because offerings led by
such banks tend to have higher overhang.
Two central messages emerge from this paper. The first is that underpricing cannot
be properly understood independently of overhang. However, most existing theories
are essentially mute on this subject. Second, much of the existing theoretical framework
regarding IPO valuation needs to be recast in terms of OCI instead of underpricing.
The same is true of the empirical work evaluating that framework. Progress on these
two fronts will lead to a much richer understanding of IPO valuation, underpricing,
and the opportunity cost of going public.
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